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Second Time a Charm:
Term Limits in Washington State |
Robert Struble, Jr.
Delivered at the 1993 Annual Meeting of
The Western Political Science Association
Assembled in Pasadena CA, March 18-20, 1993
4211 Corona Way,
Sacramento, CA 95864
(916) 486-1551
ABSTRACT:
This paper is not primarily a celebration, but rather political history as prologue. The 52% margin of victory in Washington, the narrowest to date in a statewide race, was the result of stiff resistance to term limits – a harbinger of things to come, especially in the 26 non-initiative states.
LIMIT is the Tacoma based PAC which conducted two initiative campaigns, the loss during 1991 and the comeback win of 1992. LIMIT’s historical origins and development, with both triumphs and mistakes, offer lessons and warnings about [1] financing and spending, [2] oligarchic vs. democratic decision making and [3] the clout issue and how to diffuse it tactically and theoretically.
Steering committee debates saw skirmishes that will doubtless be refought as the term limits movement grapples with the realities of a political arena in which few initiative states remain. The two key items in steering committee agendas were [1] reciprocity verses grandfathering, and [2] the shape of term limits – i.e. which legislative seats to rotate and how rapidly. The second point gave rise to revealing debates about ultimate aims and strategies for the term limits movement.
This paper closes by discussing national strategy in light of moves by the opposition in Massachusetts, Wyoming and Washington.
INTERACTIVE TABLE OF CONTENTS
Selling Rotation to State Solons
Second Time a Charm: Term Limits in Washington State
Robert Struble, Jr.
Probably the bloodiest battles in the term limits campaigns of 1990-1992 took place in the states of Washington and Massachusetts. Only in these two states did statewide term limits secure the requisite number of petitioners, yet subsequently suffer defeat. Spokane’s Tom Foley, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, personified the power of incumbency with accompanying patronage for the locality. In proportion as the Evergreen State reaped political advantage, the opposition to term limits was particularly fierce here in Washington.
At this writing Washington is the only state to defeat term limits at the polls. In Massachusetts it was not at the ballot box but on the floor of the state legislature that a populist petition drive was nullified. In an extraordinary display of Bay State parliamentary tactics, the legislature managed to keep term limits [proposition 9] from even coming to a vote at the polls. In Massachusetts, therefore, at least for the time being, the term limits movement seems stymied, while Washington remains the first and only state to stage a successful comeback.
In Washington State, the 1991 result on initiative 553 was 54 percent no, 46 percent yes. In 1992, however, with turnout up by 40 percent,[1] a modified measure [initiative 573] won 52-48%. This win was the narrowest of victories in a year that saw 14 of 14 states approve term limits by an average margin of 67 percent.
Another unusual feature of Washington’s I-573 is that it was enacted by statute, not constitutional amendment. Of the 16 states which have enacted legislative term limits since 1990, only two states, Washington and Wyoming, forbid any amending of the constitution via the initiative process. By statue, however, the electorate can initiate term limits, and voters in both states did so in 1992.
Another common feature in Washington and Wyoming is the two years waiting period before the legislature can, by a simple majority, repeal a law which the electorate enacts by initiative. In Washington, moreover, the state constitution requires a waiting period of two years before the legislature can so much as amend a successful initiative – unless by a supermajority of 2/3 in both houses. But in Wyoming the legislature can amend an initiative measure immediately, and by a simple majority. The Wyoming house of representatives approved a bill doing precisely that, and greatly easing restriction on incumbency, just three months after the election.[2] A public outcry ensued, however, and the measure died in the senate.
Incumbents have shown themselves willing to resist term limits even to the point of defying the express will of the electorate. But the electorate cannot express its will at all through the initiative process in over half the states. The fact that 16 of the 24 initiative states have now enacted term limits, while not a single non-initiative state has done so, speaks volumes about the systemic problems ahead for the term limits movement. In addressing those problems and in formulating a national strategy, Washington State has some combat experience to offer.
Late 1990 and early 1991 saw the formation of several organizations with varying strategies for enacting term limits. Far and away the most successful of these groups was LIMIT, headquartered in Tacoma. As a member of this group’s steering committee from early on, I was able to acquire first hand knowledge of its objectives and modus operandi.
During the winter of 1990-91 LIMIT formed the basic organization that would carry it through the electoral defeat of November 1991 and on to victory in November 1992. The core group consisted originally of several members of Mike Collier’s campaign staff.[3] Collier was a liberal Democrat defeated in the primary election a few months earlier when he tried to unseat a veteran Congressman, Democrat Norm Dicks. That close encounter with the power of incumbency motivated the group and ignited their initiative campaign.[4]
Sherry Bockwinkel, a professional photographer and activist in liberal causes, soon emerged as LIMIT’s Executive Director. Gene Morain, a retired businessman who provided seed money, served as Treasurer for the 553 campaign and remained 2nd in command to Bockwinkel until the initiative was enacted into law. At this writing, Morain is LIMIT’s financial secretary.
Depending on attendance, the informal steering committee consisted of one or two dozen people (rarely 30 or more) invited by the core group to meetings in Bockwinkel’s home in Tacoma.[5] Later the meetings moved to Hillside Community church (already active in liberal causes), and later still to rented office space in Tacoma.
The culturally liberal nature of the Bockwinkel led core group[6] set them apart from the term limits movement nationally which tended, with exceptions,[7] to be more conservative in orientation. One has to acknowledge the political independence of the liberals and Democrats in LIMIT; they can hardly be accused of currying favor to Democratic Speaker of the House, Tom Foley, or to the Democratic Party organization, which was hostile to term limits.
The financing of the two campaigns, Initiative 553 (1991) and I-573 (1992), stood in stark contrast. The 1991 effort outspend the 1992 campaign by a 3/2 margin – $705,403 to $394,878. Contributions from out of state, mostly from Citizens for Congressional Reform (CCR) – a Washington, D.C. political action committee dominated by the Libertarian Party – provided some 86 percent of the funds for the 1991 campaign. During 1990-1991 the I-553 campaign obtained only 14 percent of its contributions and loans from within Washington State, whereas in 1992 the I-573 campaign got 39 percent of its funding from Washingtonians.
As 1991 was an off-year, Washington was the only state with a term limits initiative on the ballot, and national organizations like CCR and Americans to Limit Congressional Terms (ALCT) paid the piper handsomely. Thus, to some extent, they called the tune.[8] Even the Jerry Brown for President campaign showed interest when the candidate came to Tacoma for the November 5, 1991 election night victory rally, a celebration which unexpectedly turned into a wake.[9]
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Table 1 Washington State, 1991 & 1992
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1991 Contributions and Loans |
% from Instate |
Total Donors 1991 |
|
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1992 Contributions and Loans |
% from Instate |
Total Donors 1992 |
|
$705,403 |
14 |
1792 |
$394,878 |
39 |
2180 |
||
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$398.821 |
48 |
110 |
$187,740 |
30 |
60
|
||
Source: see endnote[10]
By contrast the successful campaign of 1992 was much leaner in its expenditures. High overhead was jettisoned, like the $1500/month office space insisted upon by CCR’s Linda Levens. During 1991 Levens had spent two months in Tacoma drawing a $6000/month salary. Add to that the several staffers from out-of-state at $3500/month. After April, 1991, eight people were on a total payroll of $30,000/month. By contrast, in 1992 the only paid employees were Sherry Bockwinkel ($3000/month), Jan Best, a part time worker at $6.oo/hour, and paid signature gatherers at 60 cents per signature.
In total funding LIMIT had less to spend the second time around, but more was reserved for essential like media buys. LIMIT spent $167,000 on media in 1991 [none on television] compared to $180,000 in 1992 (which did include television but no newspaper ads), most of it spent in the last week. As Bockwinkel affirmed in retrospect, LIMIT dispersed its funds much more effectively in the second campaign, and got more out of a smaller budget.[11]
Spending by the opposition also declined from 1991 to 1992, again reflecting the lower national priority of the second Washington State campaign, and also the preoccupation of Speaker Tom Foley and other incumbents with their 1992 reelection campaigns. NO-on-573 raised $187,740 in 1992, half the $378,821 they spent in 1991. In 1992, funding for the anti-573 campaign came from 60 donors, verses 2180 donors to the pro-573 campaign. In 1992 fully 99.6 percent of the anti-term limits money came from PACs, up from 84 percent in 1991.[12] Thus the opposition retained its narrow base of PAC donors and lost the election, whereas LIMIT broadened its donor base and claimed a narrow victory.
In my judgment, the slimness of the margin of victory was due to factors separate from the internal organization of LIMIT. The presence of the Speaker of the U.S. House was a pork barrel boon that accentuated the potency of the clout issue. A Seattle Times Washington Poll of registered voters during the last days of the 1991 campaign reported that 52 percent feared that I-553 would decrease the state’s influence in Congress.[13] Many in Washington State still have found memories of the Warren G. Magnuson / Scoop Jackson patronage bonanza, and in touching that chord Tom Foley was a symphony unto himself.
Among several issues which plagued the term limits campaign in Washington State, the clout issue was clearly the most menacing. It played well in the press and was first rate fodder for editorial cartoons. We were told that when deprived of our congressional delegation’s touted influence, Washington State would surely be inundated with environmental disasters, including supertankers plying Puget Sound. Without Tom Foley to protect us, the Federal government would not only open up our inland waters but divert our fresh water supply to California. After all, did not the California delegation outnumber us 6-1 in the U.S. House of Representatives? The fact that every piece of legislation would have to pass the Senate, where California’s delegation was no larger than ours, somehow got lost in the tumult.
Often an election campaign is decided more by perception than reality. So after the 1991 electoral defeat, LIMIT amended the proposed law and made term limits non-retroactive, i.e. inoperative until 1998. By that time, it was reasoned, the voters would expect to loose the Speaker anyway since Tom Foley would be nearly 70 years old. Bockwinkel noted that eliminating reciprocity “was the key” to diffusing the clout issue in the second campaign.[14]
If making term limits non-retroactive was the key to electoral success, then “the sweetener” for voters was the ten state trigger clause.[15] This sweetener was added in response to widely expressed concerns in 1991 about Washington State and Colorado going it alone. In the 1992 version a trigger clause would have deferred implementation of term limits for Washington State’s congressional delegation until a total of ten states had passed limits on their own delegations to Congress. In fact 14 have done so at this writing.[15a]
Another antidote to the clout issue as it pertained specifically to Tom Foley involved his wife and political confidant, Heather Foley. In 1991 the Speaker himself had successfully stumped the state in opposition to term limits, but in 1992 he faced a real challenge in the 5th congressional district from Dr. John Sonneland. And so the Speaker campaigned for reelection, while Mrs. Foley did anti-term limits fundraising from the Speaker’s office in Washington, D.C. Mrs. Foley’s activist role had been strongly suspected for some time, but no paper trail was found until state law allowed LIMIT to inspect its opponent’s books, namely the group calling itself “NO on 573.” These records were being kept in the union headquarters of a strong supporter, the Washington Federation of State Employees [WFSE].
On October 26, the WFSE employee on duty was taken quite by surprise when Gene Morain and Jack Darragh of LIMIT arrived to inspect the anti-term limits records. She kindly provided photocopies of various documents, including a page on WFSE stationary showing more than $100,000 in pledges to the NO campaign, and with “per Heather Foley, as of 10-7-92” at the top of the page. Also copied was a letter addressed to Mrs. Foley, c/o the Speakers Office in Washington, D.C. It was signed by Evelyn Dubrow, the Vice-President & Legislative Director of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and was accompanied by a $1000 check.[16] The text of the letter had just seven words, “Heather, Good Luck, I hope this helps.” Provided at last with their paper trail, LIMIT informed the media.
The Spokesman Review, the main newspaper in Spokane, quickly came out with a major story on how Heather Foley was using the Speaker’s office to defeat an initiative campaign. The ethical implications and legal ramifications of employing public offices and facilities to fight against an initiative petitioned for by more than 200,000 voters played unfavorably in public discourse. Such publicity led to a virtual collapse in the NO campaign’s final fundraising push. The same publicity gave LIMIT’s fundraising efforts a substantial shot in the arm; $80,000 came through in the following week.[17]
LIMIT collected another media windfall when NO on 573 began airing a television spot on how LIMIT’s leadership wanted offshore drilling, supertankers, and etc. imposed on Washington State. The court backed LIMIT’s position to the extent that it issued a temporary restraining order under the state’s fair campaign practices act, and although the order was lifted two days later, the ad was never replayed. More free media publicity followed which tended to taint the NO campaign with a reputation for cheap shots.
In steering committee deliberations there were some theoretical skirmishes that will doubtless be refought as the term limits movement grapples with the realities of a political arena where but eight initiative states remain, and of those only three permit amending the state constitution via the initiative process.[18] With no firmer basis than statutory law – statutes which incumbent legislators can amend or rescind – term limits will be as secure as a calf in a den of wolves.
Reciprocity was debated quite freely in steering committee, and this issue was a key factor in the differing electoral results of 1991 and 1992. In the first debate on reciprocity there were basically three positions: [1] Make term limits fully retroactive, which would have forbidden Speaker Foley and several members of Washington’s congressional delegation from running for reelection in 1992. [2] Grandfather in all incumbents. Let the term limits clock start ticking right after the passage of the initiative, just as if Foley and his fellow incumbents were all freshmen members of Congress. [3] Allow incumbents a grace period of one full term, so that none would become ineligible for reelection until 1994.
During a January 1991 steering committee meeting at Hillside Community Church, considerable passion was expressed in defense of the first alternative, on the grounds that but few citizens get more than two weeks notice before a layoff or dismissal. Why, it was asked, should our public servants have three years notice (1991 through 1993, as per the third alternative)? Gene Morain argued, however, for alternative two, grandfathering, on grounds that targeting the familiar faces would be harder to sell in a campaign. The third alternative, a grace period, was a kind of middle ground between retroactivity and grandfathering.
The steering committee chose the middle ground, and the one-term grace period was incorporated into the 1991 initiative.[19] At the time it seemed like a moderate compromise, but in fact no state except Washington has attempted to enact term limits so retroactively.
In retrospect Morain was right. The semi-retroactive clause played decisively into Tom Foley’s hands. During his October barnstorm of the state, the Speaker of the U.S. House hit I-553 repeatedly and effectively on the clout issue, claiming that the state would lose its seniority and congressional influence in just three short years.
After the November 1991 defeat, the steering committee was more than willing to fall back on Morain’s position, and to abandon reciprocity entirely. Reciprocity was the primary issue on which Washington State had broken ranks with the national term limits groups (who provided most of our funding in 1991). The sting received after this one exercise in independence boded ill for innovative thinking afterwards on other issues.
***
Indeed LIMIT displayed a marked aversion to independent thought during deliberation on the shape of term limits – that is who to limit and how rigorously. There were two fundamental issues: [1] which offices to rotate, and [2] how rapid the rotation.
Discussions took place in several meeting prior to the filing date for initiatives early in 1991 and again in 1992. The core group around Bockwinkel showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for fundamental departures from the successful initiatives of 1990 in Oklahoma, Colorado and California. The latter state served as a kind of benchmark. California applied to its legislature the most stringent of the three rotation equations of 1990; eight years for the state senate; six years for the assembly. LIMIT so dutifully imitated California that when information arrived (inaccurate as it later turned out) that California’s 1992 initiative re the congressional delegation would permit four terms in the U.S. House; the core group hastily organized a steering committee meeting that substituted an eight year, or four terms, limit for the six year, or three terms, adopted a week earlier by the steering committee. Soon it was revealed that California wanted six years, not eight; so the core group reverted forthwith to the six years formula and informed steering committee members of the change by telephone.
Until 1993, LIMIT was a corporation whose original officers had sole legal control, and the steering committee was largely an advisory panel without legal standing or power. It met at the back and call of Bockwinkel. The steering committee did provide a wider access to volunteers, some ideas, and the appearance of democracy. However, its decisions could be overridden by the core group, none of whom was ever elected since I began working with LIMIT in December 1990.[20]
Notwithstanding the tendency of oligarchies to foster resentment and insurrection, the Bockwinkel/Morain command structure persisted; its durability derived mainly from personal leadership qualities, from being on the spot first with money, and from a willingness to do the work. On the latter score Bockwinkel and Morain were tireless workers and organizers. No evaluation of LIMIT would be balanced without noting the core group’s perseverance, organizational skills and growing political savvy. These qualities were largely responsible for the ultimate success of I-573.
The preeminence of the clout issue as a reason for opposing I-553 showed up clearly in the Seattle Times Washington poll, and in anecdotal experiences reported by petitioners. The same survey showed few voters impressed with the oft heard argument that democracy or voter choice would be restricted. The poll did show, however, that many voters were loath to remove experienced people when they were doing a good job.[21] The desirability of keeping legislators in place when and if they were performing well was, according to Bockwinkel, the second most telling and frequently heard argument against term limits. She tried to finesse this issue with the argument that good legislators were not being ousted but rather urged to seek higher office.[22]
The value of experience is a venerable and appealing issue, and in the capitols of the various non-initiative states this argument will certainly see front line service against term limits. Indeed the utility of political experience is the very issue that plagued the triennial rotation which the ‘Articles of Confederation mandated for the continental congress. In 1787, for example, Dr. Benjamin Rush observed that government would ‘never be perfected in America, until we encourage men to devote not only three years, but their whole lives to it.”[23] Edmund Burke advanced similar objections against rotation in the legislative branch of the revolutionary French government.[24]
It is significant that virtually the identical line of reasoning, the importance of experience, is one of the main arguments leveled against the term limits movement of the 1990s. The similarity between the counter-arguments to rotation in office today and two centuries ago is no coincidence. Rather it reflects something like a timeless maxim of common sense – that there is utility in experienced leadership acquired via longevity in office. Whenever rotation is mandated for 100 percent of the seats in a legislative body, it will invariably run afoul of that intuitive maxim.[25] Within LIMIT, nonetheless, this intuition, this popular wisdom, never seemed convincing to more than a small minority on the steering committee.[26]
The utility of experience is so ingrained into the American consciousness,[27] however, that it doubtless had a more prominent place in the collective thinking of LIMIT than its leadership would readily admit. The experience factor is reflected in I-573, sections 3-5, which does allow reelection after a six year sabbatical in another office or station.[28] Under this provision for restarting the term limits clock at zero after six years of absence from any particular office, both the 1991 and 1992 initiatives permitted legislators to shift from one legislative position to another, eventually returning to their original post. They would simply move around in what might be called a great square route. This four corner grand tour would begin with the lower house in the state legislature, followed by the upper house; thence to the U.S. House followed by the U.S. Senate. Nothing in the law would prevent politicians from a second or third circuit and a permanent if shifting lifetime legislative career. Many steering committee speakers saw this as acceptable, even desirable.[29]
Such a moving oligarchy would embody a form of checks and balances, with the check being term limits and the balance being concessions to careerism of a shifting sort. A problem with this system, in my steering committee minority view, was that some degree of oligarchy would be encouraged at all four corners of the great square route. Therefore, the principle of rotation in office was nowhere undiluted and uncompromised.
In a fairly extensive open-microphone steering committee debate after the defeat of I-553, Craige McMIllan[30] and this author proposed to increase the speed of rotation in the House and to exempt the Senate altogether from term limits.[31] Instead of leaving all four corners of the great square route open to oligarchy, we wanted to maximize democracy in two of the four, i.e. the lower house of the state and federal legislative branches. By more rapidly rotating the lower house we hoped to nullify or at least radically mitigate Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” in that chamber which is closest to the electorate.[32] In the upper house, however there would be no term limits whatsoever. The idea was to make a concession to oligarchy in the senate alone so that a highly democratic and uncompromising form of rotation could be applied to the house.
We argued against any balance between professionalism and rotation in office that would water down the two principles and apply this tepid blend more or less uniformly to each house of the legislative branch. Instead we proposed two formulas, each undiluted, as a way of adapting term limits to a bicameral legislature.[33]
Such an adaptation was apparently envisioned in the famous Virginia Plan introduced at the outset of the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. The Virginia Plan proposed a rotation after one term of the entire lower house of the national legislature, but would have left the upper house open to continuous reelection.[34]
In LIMIT the two most telling lines of opposition to our proposal were as follows: The first related to what I will term the Petracca precaution, i.e. the warning against motivation based on anger and retribution[35] – the very motives espoused by Jack Gargan. From 1990-1991, Gargan headed a national group called “Throw the Hypocritical Rascals Out” (THRO) whose purpose was to persuade the public to vote against incumbents per se, regardless of performance or political affiliation. Gargan’s local organizer was Glen Schroeder, then a LIMIT steering committee member. Gargan himself, wearing an “I’m mad as hell” T-shirt, was well received in a mid-1991 Tacoma appearance which LIMIT helped promote.[36] One of his most applauded lines was:
It’s the
incumbents versus us. Round up the
crew. We’re going to have a hanging party.
Thusly Gargan expressed the mindset that exercised a considerable influence in LIMIT steering committee meetings. In such an atmosphere little heed was paid to the Petracca precaution, i.e. that the principle of rotation in office is not retributive but preventative. It is a tool for civic empowerment and toward enhancing the quality of representation. As term limits advocate, Prof. Mark Petracca, had phrased it in April of 1992,
It is a
mistake and entirely inappropriate to approach term
limits as a way to “reward” legislative dereliction.[37]
A second line of opposition to our bicamerally differentiated version of term limits held that it was too complicated to be understood by the electorate. Several speakers expressed the view that “Joe Sixpack”[38] would only be confused. In steering committee debates the pervasive contempt for the intelligence of the general populace was reminiscent of the remark attributed to Alexander Hamilton: “your people, sir, is a great beast.”
At one meeting I brought my discomfort with this attitude to the attention of my fellow steering committee members, but I met not with denials on their part but bemusement and mild irritation at my own naïveté. They seemed to think of the general populace as a bull oblivious to any matador whose cape had more than one color.
In short, the steering committee turned thumbs down on the McMillan/Struble proposal because the Garganites saw it as compromising, while the matadors perceived it as too complicated for an unenlightened public.
According to a public opinion survey by the Seattle Times, some 15 percent of Washingtonians who voted against I-553 consisted of voters who had no philosophical problem with term limits. These voters decided against the ballot measure because they preferred to have congressional rotation applied uniformly to all 50 states.[39]
Such a uniform national system is not likely to be achieved on a state by state basis. Less than half the states possess the initiative process anyway. In 1990 and 1992 a total of 16 states limited the terms of their congressional delegations, but they adopted ceilings on House tenure that varied from six to twelve years.[40] Uniformity has been scuttled already. Many if not most of the 26 states which lack the initiative process are unlikely to pass term limits at all. At best their legislatures may be pressured into adopting a weak and less transforming version of term limits.
Shortly after last year’s electoral victory for term limits, the Washington State legislature began considering bills that would double the ceiling on legislative tenure from six to twelve years, and shorten to two years the current six year interval or sabbatical requisite to reeligibility.[41] Simultaneously, in February 1993, just months after Wyoming’s voters adopted six year term limits on their delegation to the House of Representatives – both state and federal – the Wyoming house of representatives passed a bill that would have raised the tenure ceiling for themselves to twelve years. Also the bill had a 50 state trigger clause, exempting the congressional delegation until all the remaining 49 states had adopted congressional term limits.[42]
In Massachusetts, Senate President, William M. Bulger, amply demonstrated the implacable opposition to be expected from incumbents on the question of limiting their own terms. Eleven times he entertained motions to recess the 1992 joint session of the house and senate (or constitutional convention). This convention had convened in Boston after citizens gathered more than 100,000 signatures under the petition process specified by the Massachusetts Constitution.
Parliamentary skullduggery continued for seven months, with recess after recess before the con-con in Massachusetts could vote to put term limits on the ballot. (To submit the measure to the electorate required only 25% of the convention, or 50 votes, which would have been forthcoming by all counts; but to defeat the recess motion required a majority). In January, 1993, Sen. Bulger employed little know rule “I” which required the con-con to adjourn ten minutes before the scheduled opening of a regular legislative session. Thus under rule “I,” as Bulger put it, “I rule,” and the citizen drive for term limits was brought to naught.[43]
***
To overcome the adamant resistance expected from incumbent legislatures, national term limits PACs are currently favoring the following strategy: Win I & R (initiative and referendum reforms) in additional states so as obtain a means to circumvent their resistant legislative branches. During the progressive period before World War I, a powerful populist upsurge resulted in I & R provisions pretty much as they exist today. In 1992 Mississippi took a page from history and adopted such a law. One wonders, however, whether advocates will enjoy success in a score or more of states by promoting I & R as an ancillary to term limits. In those same states, all the impetus and momentum of the original progressive movement failed to secure the I & R for its own sake.
Another strategy, the “critical mass” plan, shows little promise as a way of incorporating term limits into the U.S. Constitution. The critical mass strategy is to sweep all or almost all of the initiative states.[44] The initiatives would include term limits on the respective congressional delegations, in hopes that a sufficient portion of Senators and Congressmen will become term limit supporters. Congress itself would then be ready to approve and send to the states for ratification an amendment which would mandate term limits uniformly for Congress as a whole.
However, the real critical mass for a constitutional Amendment is two-thirds of both houses of Congress (67%), and only 44% of the House and 46% of the Senate are even accessible to the initiative process. The balance is supposed to be won over by the bandwagon effect of sweeping the initiative states, together with a policy of pledging candidates for Congress to support term limits.
Any attempt to convince Congress to adopt a self-denying ordinance, contrary to the natural instincts of nearly all incumbent politicians, is unlikely to yield more than the slow twelve year version of rotation, if indeed even that. The preoccupation of incumbents with reelection suggests that a more promising course of action is not to convert the Congress but rather to circumvent it. And under the U.S. Constitution, Article V, the one means to bypass Congress in the constitutional amending process is the “Convention for proposing Amendments.”
Before developing the convention theme, it is noteworthy that much of the LIMIT steering committee, and notably Gene Morain, seemed willing to settle for a Congress where a substantial minority of the members serves in rotation. Morain predicted that the seniority system would not survive scrutiny by a sizeable block of recently elected members.
With seniority or not, Morain is conceding survival to the 435 member House oligarchy. That whole elitist, anti-populist in-group, with its beltway mentality is probably a far more deeply entrenched and formidable foe to the effective enfranchisement of ordinary citizens than seniority rules adopted by either house of Congress. We can democratize the internal rules and procedures for congress to the maximum, but to what avail if most members of Congress are oligarchic in interest and outlook?
Selling Rotation to State Solons
The ultimate necessity of resolving the experience issue in such a way as to secure support from state legislators follows from the broader purpose of instituting a version of rotation that breaks the iron grip of oligarchy in Congress as a whole. To this end an Article V convention is the means. Calling a constitutional convention is possible only if 34 state legislatures submit applications for the Article V convention. Eventually, therefore, the term limits movement is going to need the help of many old style incumbent state legislators.
Accordingly it is imperative that term limits for the state legislature be juridically separate from federal term limits. It would be a major tactical blunder to submit state and federal reforms in a package that confronts the men and women who would apply for an Article V convention, i.e. state legislators, with a personal interest in opposing term limits. Furthermore, those same solons would be asked to ratify what emerges from the convention.
Second, specifically federal term limits will be most attractive to legislators as a reform that just happens to increase their own chances for advancement. We should be encouraging state solons to see term limits favorably from the point of view of self-interest, as paving the road from the state legislature to the Congress (U.S. House rotation will increase vacancies, hence opportunities) and thence to a possible U.S. Senate career – a career path that is rocky and problematical for them today.
To make congressional rotation additionally attractive to state legislators, term limits for the lower house of congress might be combined with provisions for recalling Congressmen. Permitting a simple majority of the legislators who reside in a given congressional district to require a recall election in the respective district will give legislators an enhanced voice in Washington, D.C. Although recall elections are decided by the voters, the new power of legislators to initiate such elections would restore some of the influence which the state governments lost in 1913, when the seventeenth Amendment transferred directly to the people the election of U.S. Senators. For most of the twentieth century the state capitols have lacked the national stature and clout that used to emanate from the power of each legislature to decide some part of the congressional membership.
The Framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to have an authoritative link between the state legislatures and one house of Congress. The combination of rotation and recall for the U.S. House of Representatives (similar to the old Virginia Plan) would give our state senators and representatives far more voice and interest in national affairs than they have had since 1913. This renewed political link between the states and Congress will decrease the isolation of the nation’s Capitol, and will increase the prestige and potency of a seat in a state legislature.
Not only would recall complement rotation as a populist principle, it would also help to bring legislators aboard the movement for term limitation. Without them a uniform constitutional system of rotation in office will be unachievable, and term limits will fall short of its potential to upgrade the American political system.
***
One of the issues that surfaced in LIMIT steering committee debates in the state of Washington was whether our objective should be to establish a genuine citizen legislature, or, less ambitiously, to break up the seniority system and settle for a moving oligarchy. Many seemed content with the latter goal. Others saw six year limits in the House as insufficiently transforming to do more than dent what Robert Michels termed the iron law of oligarchy.
Will term limits be a like a large push-broom sweeping at least one house clean, or a whisk broom at work in both legislative chambers? The answer may well depend on whether rotation in office is proposed in a form that [1] enables incumbents at the state level to continue pursuing legislative careers, [2] enhances opportunity for state solons to influence the Congress and perhaps get there themselves, [3] promotes a system of rotation that is suitable to a bicameral legislative branch.[45] [46]
[1] In 1991 total votes cast, both pro and con, on term limits was 1,505,514; compared to 2,138,245 in 1992. To what extent the additional 632,731 votes in 1992 favored term limits would be little more than speculation. Term limits lost by 123,858 votes in 1991, but won in 1992 by 101,725 votes.
[2] “Wyoming voters thought they were sending a clear message last Fall when they gave term limits 77% support, the highest of any state initiative…. Last week, (WY) House Speaker, Doug Chamberlain, pushed through two ‘amendments’ to the new term limits law. Conveniently, House Members decided the limit on their own tenure should be 12 years, instead of the six the voters chose. Legislators also decided the limits on Wyoming’s congressional delegation won’t apply until every other state has first passed its own term limits.” [“Voters Be Damned,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1993].
[3] Mike Collier himself left the steering committee after several months. Another early departure was Dane Meyer, the group’s first chairman, who originated LIMIT’s name (Limitation Initiative Mandating Incumbent Terms). Gene Morain, Paul Festag, Sherry Bockwinkel and Tom Donnelly remained activists through the 1992 campaign.
I myself joined the steering committee December 17, 1990. Though generally supportive on tactics and an occasional public speaker for the movement, I dissented vociferously in steering committee meetings on one of the initiative’s provisions. For a few months in 1991 I stopped attending meetings after the group defeated decisively an amendment to the initiative along the lines of my writings, i.e. leaving the Senate open to continuous service. On the early history of LIMIT see, David J. Olson, “Term Limits Fail in Washington,” Limiting Legislative Terms (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1992), pp. 70-74.
[4] Telephone interview with Paul Festag, 2/15/93. Festag was LIMIT’s vice-president during the 1991 campaign.
[5] A steering committee meeting in Bockwinkel’s home was held August 5, 1991 to which 25 people were invited. The roster of 31 people invited to the steering committee meeting of August 29, 1991 in newly rented office space was as follows: Sam Allred, Joe Alonzo, Sherry Bockwinkel, Frank Bonnell, Joe Curiel, Jonnie DeAnda, Tom Donnelly, Georgia Duff, Linda Eggelston, Mike Fabre, Roy Ferguson, Paul Festag, Lynn Fritchman, Kelly Haughton, Bill Jolly, Gary Leschner, Craige McMillan, state senator Jack Metcalf, Dane Meyer, Cindee Moore, Gene Morain, Jim Morehouse, Helen Peoples, Louise Peterson, Karen Ramsauer-Coleman, Prof. Wallace Rudolph, Glenn Schroeder, Bob Struble, Susan Summer, Mar Jo Sweedenburg, Bob Warfield.
To a steering committee meeting of April 10, 1992 just 17 were invited, including ten carryovers from the above list: Allred, Bockwinkel, DeAnda, Donnelly, Festag, Moore, Morain, Peterson, Schroeder, Struble. The seven who had not been on the August 29, 1991 steering committee invitation list were: Phyllis Barret, Amy Festag, Jim McDaniel, Otto Matsch, Bert Mueller, Connie O’Neal, Mike Tierney.
[6] In 1991, the core group consulted with some frequency (once was too frequent for my tastes) with the Hemlock Society group running initiative 119 (Death with Dignity). I-119 shared the November 1991 ballot with I-553 and both suffered defeat. David J. Olson, “Term Limits Fail in Washington,” supra, p. 70 describes the Collier staff as “a group of self-described left-wing Democrats – including community organizers, SANE/FREEZE supporters, gay and lesbian rights proponents, and peace activists.” Cf. Seattle Post Intelligencer, July 18, 1991, p. A1.
[7] Former Oklahoma state legislator, Cleta Mitchell, and Univ. of California Irvine political scientist, Mark Petracca, are both self-described liberal Democrats.
[8] David J. Olson, “Term Limits Fail in Washington,” supra, p. 75.
[9] On financing for the 1991 campaign see, Olson, Ibid., pp. 84-86.
[10] Table 1 derived from statistics provided by the LIMIT office, from interview with Sherry Bockwinkel, 22 December 1992, and from Olson, ibid., p. 86.
[11] Interview with Sherry Bockwinkel, 22 December 1992. The annual LIMIT campaign final summary showed 29% of the total budget went for marketing in 1991, as compared to 52% in 1992.
[12] Bockwinkel interview, ibid., and telephone interview 21 February 1992.
[13] In the poll 29% of the 500 registered voters surveyed said I-553 would leave Washington’s congressional influence about the same, while 8% thought it would increase. [Seattle Times, Nov. 6, 1991, pp. A1-A2]. At lease six polls were taken during the 1991 campaign [Olson, supra, pp. 83-85].
[14] Bockwinkel interview, 22 December 1992.
[15] Ibid.
15a By 1995, when the Court overturned term limits [U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, May 22, 1995] 23 of the states had passed term limits on members of Congress
[16] Letter from Evelyn Dubrow to Bob Struble, dated October 7, 1992.
[17] Bockwinkel interview, Dec. 22, 1992.
[18] Sixteen states have used the initiative process to limit legislative terms; 14 of the 16 include their congressional delegation. The eight states that do have the initiave process but have yet to enact term limits for the legislative branch are: Alaska, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, Utah. Of these states, only in Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Nevada can the initiative process be applied to constitutional amendments.
At present, however, the initiative process is unworkable in Massachusetts for the purpose of term limits as long as Sen. Bulger prevents the legislature from taking a vote on submitting the question to the ballot.
Mississippi added the initiative process to the state constitution in November, 1992, but the measure emerged in such a cumbersome and weakened form that it is virtually unworkable as a way of bypassing a hostile legislature. As Lloyd Gray, editor of the Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal in Tupelo, MI observed: The measure was “obviously written so that it can never be implemented.” [telephone interview 2/23/93]
[19] “Individuals who have already reached the maximum term of service upon passage of this initiative shall be eligible to serve one additional term….” [I-553] This wording was adopted in steering committee in early January, 1991.
[20] After the passage of term limits in Washington state the hierarchy of LIMIT changed. On Feb. 9, 1993, LIMIT held formal elections and named a nine member executive board in place of the old steering committee.
[21] Seattle Times Washington Poll, Nov. 6, 1991, p. A2 reported the following reasons voters opposed I-553: It “would hurt us in Congress,” 16%; it would be “OK only if done nationally,” 15%; “we can vote them out,” 15%; the measure “would remove experienced people,” 12%; there “should be no limits,” 10%; “it’s generally a bad idea,” 8%; “it won’t work,” 7%; and it “restricts my choice,” 4%. [Italics mine]
[22] Interview with Sherry Bockwinkel, 22 Dec. 1992.
[23] Benjamin Rush, “On the Defects of the Confederation,” in the Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 28. Estimated date of Rush’s composition, c. May 1787.
[24] “By the new French constitution,” wrote Burke in 1790, “the best and wisest representatives go equally with the worst into this Limbus Patrum.” [Edmund Burke, Reflections On the Revolution in France (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 305-06; cf. pp. 139, 299, fn.]
[25] The two previous paragraphs are excerpted in part from Robert Struble, Jr., “Adapting Term Limits to a Bicameral Congress,” Long Term View 1 (winter 1992), 12. LTV is published by the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover MA.
[26] Three steering committee members expressed firm support for the idea of leaving the senate open to continuous service: Bob Warfield, Craige McMillan, and myself.
[27] Robert Struble, Jr., “House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation,” Political Science Quarterly 94 (winter 1979-80): 662-63.
[28] Sec. 3 [1]: “No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the house of representatives of the legislature who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as a member of the house of representatives of the legislature during six of the previous twelve years.”
Sec. 3 [2] pertains to the state senate according to the formula “eight of the previous fourteen years.”
Sec. 3 [3] pertains to legislative service in either house and denies ballot access to a person “who has served as a member of the legislature for fourteen of the previous twenty years.”
Sec. 4 pertains to service in the U.S. House of Representatives and denies ballot access to a person “who will have served, or but for resignation would have served” as a member “during six of the previous twelve years.”
Sec. 5 pertains to service in the U.S. Senate and denies ballot access to a person “who will have served, or but for resignation would have served” as a member “during twelve of the previous eighteen years.”
The 1991 measure, I-553, would have been essentially identical to the above except that section 3 [3] woul d have limited service to 14 instead of ten years. Also service in either house of the U.S. Congress would have been limited to 12 years. In addition, I-573 denied ballot access whereas I-553 prohibited reelection outright.
[29] My notes on the January 2, 1991 meeting at Bockwinkel’s home read as follows: “The idea of a ‘moving oligarchy’ seemed to find favor, with people being pushed along from office to office by the term limits, rather than a citizen legislature manifested in one house.”
[30] Craige McMillan was the co-founder with Jim Mears (Eric McAtte, treasurer) of Citizens for Good Government, informally known as the Committee To De-Elect the Congress. In 1991 CFGG launched term limit campaigns against state officials ‘initiative 563] and Washington State’s congressional delegation [I-564]. The effort was under-financed, however, raising less than $2000. Some 20,000 signatures were collected per initiative, or about 10% the requisite number for getting on the ballot. When CFGG dissolved, McMillan endorsed I-553 and became active for a time in LIMIT.
[31] Steering committee meeting held at PSU Law School, December 1991…. Craige McMillan and I had discussed privately the ideas that are set forth in Robert Struble, Jr., “Adapting Term Limits to a Bicameral Congress,” Long Term View 1 (Winter 1992): 11-19.
[32] Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Hearst’s International Library Co., 1915), pp. 390-92, 400-402, contains a statement of the iron law of oligarchy. Michels finds the duration of tenure inversely related to democracy, and directly related to the rise of oligarchy (pp. 36, 40, 45, 84, 97-98, 127, 156, 400-01).
[33] For a more extensive discussion see my “Adapting Term Limits to a Bicameral Congress,” Long Term View 1 (Winter 1992): 11-19; also, “Rotation in Office: Rapid but Restricted to the House,” PS: Political Science & Politics 24 (March 1991): 34-37; followed by PS 24 (December 1991): 631-32, which is my rebuttal to Michael Parenti’s critique. For an extensive look at the history of rotation in office in America, see alo my “House turnover and the Principle of Rotation,” PSQ 94, supra, 649-667.
[34] Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), 1:20. “Res[olved] that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every ___ for the term of ___; …to be incapable of reelection for the space of ___ after the expiration of their term of service; and to be subject to recall.”
[35] Mark Petracca, “The Right Reform, The Wrong Reasons,” rough draft dated April 10, 1992, 4 pp.
[36] Jack Gargan’s speech was delivered at Tacoma Community College, June 8, 1991. Sherry Bockwinkel had invited him by telephone and he drove out by car, speaking along the way in various states.
[37] Petracca, “The Right Reform, The Wrong Reasons,” supra, p. 2.
[38] “Joe Sixpack” was Glen Schroeder’s contribution.
[39] Seattle Times Washington Poll, supra, p. A2.
[40] In 1992 North and South Dakota enacted 12 year limits everywhere in the legislative branch, although in the case of ND, not in the congressional delegation. Oklahoma did likewise at the state level in 1990, as did Colorado for its congressional delegation. In 1992 four states limited the U.S. House to 8 years, namely Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio. Eight states enacted six year limits for the U.S. House: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming.
[41] The Heavey bill, HJR 4203 (1993); The McCaslin Bill, SB 5095 (1993).
[42] Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1993.
[43] Telephone interviews with LIMITS director in Massachusetts, Dorothea Thomas-Vitrac, 12/31/1992 and 1/7/1993.
[44] See above, endnote 18.
[45] Special gratitude is extended to Craige McMillan, the co-founder of the Committee for Good Government, for helpful suggestions after proofreading this article.
[46] Note: this online edition was transcribed in 2009 – with no substantive modifications – from the original manuscript presented at the WPSA annual meeting of 1993. For the reader’s convenience, a table of contents and some hyperlinks have been added.