Persuading
the 7400
Crossing
into Illegality
Conclusion
Appendices
Chapter Four_
INSURRECTION OF SUEDE –– PLAN A:
The
rural revolt of 1786-87 led by Daniel Shays in western Massachusetts was a mere
stick of dynamite compared to the nuclear devastation, as it were, that the
post-1963 revolution has inflicted on the polity, economy and culture of the
USA. By February, 1787, Shays’ Rebellion had already been suppressed.
Still, the notoriety of the event served as the catalyst for the constitutional
convention later that year in Philadelphia.[1] How then can we
suppose that in the 21st century a second constitutional convention would be
medicine too strong, or somehow disproportionate to the disaster we face as a
direct result of the ongoing postmodernist revolution? What patriot would
entertain such an un-American notion as the view that a counterrevolution is
too extreme in dealing with the abuse of power, when indeed this nation originated in a Revolution that was mainly about the
principles and the forms of power?[2] And
who can see the ongoing process of demoting and degrading the Constitution and yet
quibble about intervention by the people at the level of the written
Constitution itself?
Of course the officeholder class condemns all this. They
sympathize easily with Alexander Hamilton’s alleged aristocratic sneer against Jeffersonian democracy:
“Your people, sir,—your people is a great beast.” In the 1980's
President Ronald Reagan complained that convention foes across the political
spectrum, from the ACLU to the John Birch Society, had bought into the “wild beasts theory.”
Today a formidable array of spin doctors remains ready and eager to
defend the
postmodernist elite and to discredit the populist process inherent in an Article V
convention. “Hands off
the Constitution” is one way of reminding people that their betters know best,
and that we ourselves are unqualified to meddle with the highest law of the
land.
Postmodernist Americans are schooled to submit to a machine-like society
that demands obedience to a host of rules, regulations and requirements – from
traffic lights to bicycle-helmet laws to innumerable other mandates from on
high, ranging from high finance to hate speech. Big brother is looking
over your shoulder; just ask Martha Stewart or Bobby Fischer. Publicizing
the plights of such individuals teaches the rest of us to keep to our queue. The Milgram
Studies beginning in 1963 showed the extent to which the ethic of blind
submission to authority had set into American culture.[3]
The acquiescent culture enables the postmodernist regime to sell
the idea that a judicial oligarchy – unelected and irremovable – is one of our
democracy’s mainstays, and that the convention envisioned by the Framers of the
Constitution is too dangerous for the uninitiated to touch. They have
circulated the view that the document which begins with the words, “We the
People,” is like the Arc of the Covenant. Only the priestly class, the
politburo of nine in their black vestments, are worthy to enter the sanctuary
where the amending process is conducted. Let the Levites in their
judicial robes handle any modifications, but manifestly not us (we the people)
whose elected convention might be irresponsible and “runaway” with the process.
This chapter is predicated on the proposition that the reverse is true.
The governing elite has produced a royal mess. Now it is up to us, the
governed, to put things back into order.
The Article V Amending Provisions
The
history of the convention as a means of altering the fundamental law of a nation
is documented in "Prelude to the Grand Convention," the first chapter
of a meticulously researched book published in 1988 by Oxford University
Press. The author, Russell Caplan, notes that the prototype for a
constitutional convention was the momentous convocation at Runnymede in 1215.[3a] On that field by the Thames River, the English
barons assembled and won the Magna Carta from the oppressive King John.
Against
oppressive government of any kind, royal or otherwise, the authors of the great
charter of American liberties, the U.S. Constitution, sought to establish
institutional checks and balances. In framing the Constitution as the
fundamental embodiment of such safeguards, the grand convention (assembled in
Philadelphia, 1787) anticipated that at some point amending the basic law of the
land might become necessary and yet be squelched by an unresponsive Congress.
None of
the Founding Fathers were ignorant of the history of oppression perpetrated
by King George III and earlier English monarchs. Many of the Founders were
educated men well schooled in the history of antiquity, and (unlike too many
college students today) they were familiar with the writings of political
philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero.
In the fifth chapter of Politics,
Aristotle declares revolution and constitutional change
to be one and the same thing. He then considers two categories of
revolution: First, complete change from one constitution to another, which
is what the Framers did in 1787. Second, and most relevant to our constellation amendment,
Aristotle analyzes modification of an
existing constitution.[4]
While amending the U.S. Constitution as
per Aristotle’s second category will be revolutionary in nature, or rather
counterrevolutionary because our aim is to restore the written Constitution, such a
fundamental change would in no way gainsay the wisdom of the
Framers. On the contrary, at the convention of 1787 the Framers themselves recommended to future generations not one but two methods of
changing the document they created, and both methods remain today unaltered in
the fifth article of the original Constitution. Article V of the U.S.
Constitution defines the amending process as follows (italics added):
The Congress, whenever
two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof,[5] as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided...that no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
And so any movement to amend the
Constitution legally and peacefully must take one of two routes: (1) the usual
course through Congress, or (2) through the convention which Congress calls but
does not control. The latter and more revolutionary approach, with its
restricted congressional role, is eminently preferable given the principle of
jurisprudence that no person be judge of his own case. In the constellation law there are
a number of provisions where it would be like allowing the defendant to move
from the dock to the jury if the verdict is left to Congress. For example,
section three reforms the committee system –– the exact place where so many
oligarchs in Congress have staked their claims to personal power.
Where
could justice be sought, when the
offender was at the same time the judge[6]
Moreover the first section of the
constellation law rotates every member of the House of Representatives.
How many Congressmen can be impartial on the question of terminating their own
tenure in office?
Yet another reason for the convention
approach comes to us by simple process of elimination, in that the alternative method
– going through Congress and its conjoined party system – is manifestly
unworkable. Party politics operates by coalition building too, but
political party coalitions in this country would be hopelessly incongruous if
juxtaposed to a quintuple coalition of workers, believers, voters,
together with defenders of peace / environment, and domiciliary security.
The latter coalition spans the political spectrum, from liberal to
conservative, whereas the American two-party system is geared to elections that
give power to a much narrower bracket of spoils seekers.
For the purpose of pushing through an
amendment that embraces left, center and right, the multi-party system that
prevails in Europe and elsewhere would, though impractical in this country, be
theoretically possible. Europe’s multi-party process has not
infrequently empowered a left-right coalition after elections fail to yield a
majority for any political party.
In America, however, the two-party system
is intended by design to assure a majority to the leading party. In the
United States coalitions form before the election, not after, so that from the
outset activists of the left and right are divided by party battle lines that
render ideological diversity difficult, if not impossible. By the time
the smoke clears, the government’s ideological composition is already decided,
and invariably it excludes one or more of the elements that our quintuple
coalition would embrace.
Another special American problem is that
ideological principles are apportioned between the parties in ways that create
unnatural opposition between groups that might otherwise be allied. Yes,
the quintuple combination is also imposed from above in the sense that its raison
d’être, the constellation law, does embody a predetermined pentagon of
interests. But party politics embodies not so natural a
combination. At their worst political parties are coalitions begotten by
headmen like Boss Tweed, and organizations like Tammany Hall, followed by their
ilk of latter-day political brawlers. Such a coalition might perchance,
but more often does not, conform to national needs.
Our coalition will, on the other hand, be
about nothing other than national interests. The proposed quintuple
coalition will field no candidates whatsoever. We would focus, instead, on
specific national reforms, rather than devising ways to help our favorite
gladiator(s) subdue foes in the political arena.
Some
risk is implicit, to be sure, in the fact that the five corners of our
coalition are not without factional baggage that could drag us into internecine
strife. We must work assiduously to avoid the discord that might array
the libertarian against the social conservative; or pit peace advocates like Michael
Moore against his counterparts on the issue of
Second Amendment rights.
By
way of example, friction does in fact afflict rank and file members of
organized labor. The leadership of labor unions has such a firm and
longstanding commitment to the Democrat Party that culturally conservative
laborites find themselves in a shotgun wedding, walking down the aisle as it
were, with a bouquet of pro-abortion and pro-homosexual agendas. And yet,
for better or for worse, the average laborite still strides along, qualms and
all.
In support of the constellation law, only a relative few potential insurgents
are likely to join, heart and soul, with each and every corner of the quintuple
coalition. Any left-center-right alliance will inevitably produce
diffidence and friction among the allies. But the higher the cause, the
more readily will people override their qualms and overlook contradictory
values. On the Ides of March, 2003, my daughter and I demonstrated at the Federal Building in Seattle. We stood in coalition with a Congressman whose views on social
issues were diametrically opposed to ours.[7] What governed us was the overriding cause of keeping
the peace by opposing the impending invasion of Iraq. Similarly, the
salvation of our country ought to push a host of divisive issues to the back
burner.
Despite inevitable friction within the
quintuple coalition, we can promote concord by stressing the essential
compatibility of these basic principles:
§ conservation
§ peace with foreign countries
§ tax-free domiciles
§ 2nd Amendment rights
§ increased demand for labor
§ clean government advocacy
§ Judeo-Christian values
Party Politics
Party politics
is hopelessly intertwined with the congressional process of amending the Constitution. As an instrument to promote our
pentagon of purposes, party politics as manifested in the Congress today is
quite inadequate – and even inappropriate if it were workable, which it is not.
Article V offers the convention method, however, which would be a fitting way
to enact an arch-amendment to the Constitution. As cited above in the
first chapter, but worth repeating, ex-chief justice Brennan
of the Michigan Supreme Court advocates an Article V Convention because, says
he:
…the people of the states are brought together in
their most sovereign capacity.
Such a convention would be an awesome and august assemblage. It
would bring a new, responsible dimension to American politics.
Before assessing the practical potential in a
constitutional convention, we need to dismiss the idea of relying on Congress
to propose the arch-amendment. There are two congressional options: use the existing two party system or create a new political party.
The first approach would mean getting the Democrats and/or the Republicans to
endorse the constellation law, and then secure a two thirds majority vote for
the arch-amendment in both houses of Congress. Let it simply be said that
this strategy is politically impossible; it would ensure failure if we pursued
it.
The second approach using party politics would involve realignment
into a new party system. The theory goes like this: If a political
party is formed from scratch, a party that embraces the quintuple coalition’s
purposes, then once the party takes power it could push the constellation
amendment through the U.S. Congress under Article V. If we achieve our
purposes by campaigning for a new political party, we preempt more radical
methods like a constitutional convention, civil disobedience, or armed revolution.
The strategy, of taking over by creating a powerful new
political party, encounters at least four fundamental flaws:
First, regardless of whether the party competes in a multi-party or
two-party system, political parties are defined by platforms that embrace many
more issues than the constellation law embodies. Therefore, the party
process would necessarily dissipate and scatter our energies, irrespective of
whether the party to which we pin our hopes is new or old. In order to
prevail against the postmodernist regime, we need to gather and focus our
efforts.
Second, the winner-take-all election laws throughout the United
States (as opposed to proportional representation) embody a strong bias against
third parties. For more than a century, the system has denied third
parties any real share in governmental power at the federal level.
Third, minor party movements have a weakening track record since
the mid-20th century, and have wasted reformers’ time and effort.
Fourth, the process of amending the constitution under Article V
requires a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress. The prospects are
extremely poor for either a newly created party, or an older reformed party, to
secure a supermajority in both chambers of Congress — i.e. two-thirds of the
House of Representatives plus two-thirds of the Senate. Since the Great
Depression of the 1930's, only one election (1964) has yielded a supermajority for the
Democrats in both houses.[8]
There has been no such supermajority for the Republican Party since
Reconstruction (election of 1872).
For the foregoing reasons it is necessary to bypass the party
system, to which Congress is inextricably linked. Building our quintuple
coalition for the purpose of propelling some political party to power would
only lead to exasperation, defeat and despair. Attempting to implement
Article V by means of party politics would therefore be like pushing the
proverbial bolder up the hill but never reaching the top, except that unlike
king Sisyphus in Hades our punishment would be in this world and
self-inflicted.
The Article V Convention
|
|
|
Abraham Lincoln
|
Many
other aspects of the constellation law are more suitable for a constitutional
convention — the Fifth Article’s second method. During the American
Revolution, in fact, five of the 13 states preferred constitutional conventions
to the point of forbidding the legislative branch any role whatsoever in the
amending process. President Lincoln’s
inaugural observation still applies:
...the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments
to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to
take or reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen for the
purpose....[9]
Indeed the Article V convention was intended by many of the
country's founding generation of leaders to be the means to accomplish periodic
adaptation of the U.S. Constitution to changing times. Born the same year
as Jefferson, Samuel Williams of Vermont (1743-1817), saw the federal constitutional
convention as the vehicle for what today we term the “living, breathing constitution.”
Congregational minister, Harvard professor, author of the first history of
Vermont, and founder of Vermont's oldest continuously published newspaper; Rev.
Williams considered a rigid, unchanging constitution to be high folly, in that
"no
policy would appear more puerile or contemptible to the people of America, than
an attempt to bind posterity to our forms, or to confine them to our degrees of
knowledge, and improvement: The aim is altogether the reverse, to
make provision for the perpetual improvement and progression of the government
itself….”
This constitutional flexibility was, wrote Williams, built into Article V by the
Framers:
Upon this idea it is one of
the essential and constituent parts of American government, that conventions
shall be called at certain periods of time, to alter, amend, and improve the
present form and constitution of government; as the state, circumstances,
and improvements of society, shall then require.
Thus provision is made, that the improvement in government, shall
keep pace with the improvement of society in America.[10]
According to the preeminent Article V
historian, Russell Caplan, “Nothing would
surprise the framers more than the confusion surrounding the convention method
of amendment, for it was common and accepted in their time.
The convention route had been built with familiar materials; it was not
intended to be, nor did it start out as, an especially clandestine procedure.”[10a]
Politicians answered to their own
agendas, however, and soon the oligarchy – as
opposed to “We the People” – came to dominate the amending process.
Instead of periodic conventions (as per
Thomas Jefferson’s revolution every 20 years), the Congress took exclusive
charge of initiating amendments to the written document, while the courts formed
a de facto standing convention to
amend between the lines of the “living, breathing constitution.”
Thus the courts and the professional politicians monopolized control over
constitutional changes by reducing the Article V convention process to the
status of a dead letter.
Today the fear of returning to the Framers' vision, and of restoring
the constitutional convention as “one of the essential and
constituent parts of American government”
(Williams, supra), tends to grow in
direct proportion to one’s rank in the established power structure.
Longtime homesteaders in the House or Senate will tend to look askance at the
convention process, and more than a few will hate it with a passion. There
have been exceptions, like the illustrious Illinois Senator, Everett Dirksen. In
the case of the Presidency, the unusual process of rising quickly through the
ranks might save leaders like Lincoln, Eisenhower and Reagan from too thorough acclimatization
to the D.C. establishment. But generally, as Antonin Scalia observed, “(Congress) does not want
amendment power to be anywhere but in its own hands.”[10b]
The
worst of the postmodernist powerholders are especially fearful because the Article V
convention is the
method bequeathed to us as a way around
despotic or usurpatious federal government. The Meriwether Lewis of the trek toward
judicial dictatorship, Chief Justice Earl Warren, fretted in 1963
that in the hands of “an uninformed public,” an Article V
convention “could soon destroy the foundations of the
Constitution.” But President Dwight Eisenhower, who considered his
nomination of Earl Warren to be the greatest mistake of his Administration,
endorsed the convention process.[10c]
Usurpers are high level thieves far more disruptive of domestic
tranquility than anything bank robbers or muggers can do to threaten
society. Usurpers dread the Article V convention because, combined with
state ratifications, it could empower the people to repossess what has been
stolen.
It should come as no surprise when high level incumbents
have a visceral dislike for the practical means whereby the people might return
the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the bureaucracy to their proper places in
the constitutional design. In order to discredit the very process of Article
V, they field a formidable array of spin doctors. The hypnotic spin that
bedazzles us is mainly about fear, danger and dread. To break the spell,
let us consider safeguards.
Seven
Safeguards
One of America's most effective generals wrote during D-Day, 1944:
"Take calculated risks. That is quite different from being
rash."[11]
A military hero from early American history, John Paul Jones, declared, “he who
will not risk cannot win.” Indeed, risk is a characteristic element in
almost anything worth achieving. It is said that a second convention –
the first at the national level since 1787 – will entail some risk. True
enough, yet the pursuit of a risk-free world is sham and deception. With
that pioneer of democracy, Pericles, let us remember:
Happiness depends on being free,
and freedom depends on being courageous.[12]
Moreover, not every imagined danger is realistic. Some years back
a church newspaper in Spokane, Washington editorialized tremulously that a
runaway convention might emulate mainland China and mandate abortion after a
mother has a certain number of children.[13] Other groups were frightened that a convention
would abrogate or mutilate the Bill of Rights.[14] Although these fears are somewhat far-fetched,
they are considered later in this chapter to illustrate the checks built into
the Constitution's fifth article.
Law Professors Albert E. Jenner, Jr. and Stephen J. Safranek argued
in 1996 that “the convention method is a safer method of amendment than through
Congress.”[15]
On the question of safety versus risk, I would add that in recent decades the
Supreme Court has become a quasi-constitutional convention, permanent and
continuing, which lacks any of the safeguards and ratification requirements
intrinsic to a genuine Article V convention.
Many Federal court rulings have gone far beyond the original intent
of the first ten Amendments, and have for all practical purposes been amending
the Bill of Rights by judicial fiat. I submit that the convention
authorized by the Framers of the Constitution, replete with checks and
balances, is a minuscule threat to the Bill of Rights, as compared to the
direct, real and immediate threats posed by today's de facto convention.
The nine unelected and irremovable Justices are linked to the people at most
remotely. It is this ongoing quasi-convention, this postmodernist
politburo in black robes, which constitutes the clear and present danger.
And yet the 2004 platform of the Constitution Party rated this real
and ongoing threat as less risky than the fifth Article of the U.S. Constitution:
We
oppose any attempt to call for a Constitutional convention, for any purpose
whatsoever, because it cannot be limited to any single issue, and such
convention could seriously erode our Constitutionally protected unalienable
rights.
plank 7,
Constitution Party platform, 2004
On this point the Constitution Party seems
to be cut from much the same mold as the old Federalist Party whose leaders were
quite paranoid about the prospect of a second constitutional convention.
Said Thomas Jefferson in 1800, “the very word convention gives them the
horrors, as in the present democratical spirit of America, they fear they should
lose some of the favorite morsels of the constitution.”[15a] Perhaps the authors and supporters of
C.P. plank #7 should
pray for a measure of the boldness and courage implicit in FDR’s inaugural plea
of 1933, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”
By contrast to decrees issuing from the de facto
constitutional convention which the activist federal judiciary comprises, the
straightforward system set forth in Article V of the Constitution is checked by
at least seven safeguards. These checks would reduce risks associated
with a constitutional convention far below the imminent peril posed by runaway
legislation from the bench.
First and foremost among
checks is what the Declaration of Independence calls "a firm reliance on
the Protection of Divine Providence." In campaigning for the constellation
law we will be seeking to honor God. It will be a worthy cause and, as it
was said by one of the Declaration's signers, the Rev. John Witherspoon,
If
your cause is just, you may look
with confidence to the Lord, and
entreat Him to plead it as his own.
Second, we can expect the
American voters to cast their own check in advance against a maverick or
runaway convention. Hopefully the electorate will put prudent convention
delegates in the majority.
Third, we will have to
build a campaign to promote calling the convention, and the infrastructure of
that campaign can quickly change gears and oppose opportunist attempts to
divert a convention to their agenda. It will depend on who does the
better job organizing. If we develop a national campaign organization
strong enough to get 34 states to petition for a convention, we will be in a
good position to turn that organization to the election of delegates who are
favorable to the agenda on behalf of which the convention was called in the
first place. In other words, if the postmodernist regime is able to
prevent the requisite 34 state applications, there will be no convention –
whereupon we will have to look to plan B as elucidated in chapter five.
On the other hand, if we do have the clout to convene a convention, then we
should also have the wherewithal to get a majority of delegates elected who are
friends to an unaltered constellation law.
A related fourth check to
a runaway convention is the awareness during the convention proceedings that betraying
our movement –– a force strong enough to call the first convention in more than
two centuries — will be risky in itself. Plan B, the fallback option,
will loom like a sword of Damocles over delegates inclined to divert the
convention from its intended purpose.
A fifth check to a
runaway convention is the explicit constitutional requirement that
three-fourths of the states must ratify what the convention proposes before it
becomes law. A runaway convention would be a nullity without ratification
of its proposals by 38 of the 50 states.
For a state to withhold approval it suffices if but one house of
the legislature does nothing with a motion, or tables it, or buries it in
committee. Non-ratification requires no vote at all, but simply inactivity
on the part of one house of the legislature.
Since it takes 38 states to ratify an Amendment, it would require
only thirteen states to withhold approval and the aforementioned abortion
mandate would come to nothing. After Roe v. Wade in 1973 sixteen states
applied to Congress for a convention to limit abortion.[16] If a convention were to go the opposite way
and propose any sort of mandatory abortions, those sixteen states – probably
considerably more – would refuse to ratify.[17]
In regard to the fears for the Bill of Rights, the first ten
Amendments have become a national treasure whose original wording is almost
sacrosanct. It is doubtful whether eliminating or emasculating even one
of the ten would receive the approval of a single state, much less 38.
Proposals like professor Richard Labunski’s (to abolish the second Amendment)
would get nowhere in the state legislatures, as he himself admits in his book, The
Second Constitutional Convention.[18]
The flip side of this safeguard, it must be conceded, is the
distinct possibility that opponents will be able to arrest the constellation
law at the ratification stage. Such an event would compel us to opt for
the much higher risk plan B, where checks and safeguards are manifestly fewer.
A sixth check is news
coverage of the convention proceedings. Whether the convention is
broadcast nationwide or only reported by journalists, the news would spread
like wildfire if there were any major departure from the agenda set forth in
the original state applications for a constitutional convention. Feedback to the
convention
sent by alerted state legislators and via public opinion would constitute a
swift and potentially conclusive check in itself. However, this check
will be negated if – like the convention of 1787 – delegates secure a news
blackout.[19]
A seventh check is unique
to the twelvefold structure of the proposed Amendment. Assuming that it
becomes the basis of a convention call by the states, and by virtue of its
incorporating the Judeo-Christian symbolism in the number twelve, the
consequent religious dimension of the convention agenda – the twelve lights
amendment – will pose formidable practical problems for delegates who might
want to add provisions on, say for example, abolition of the Electoral College.[20] The twelve sections
are already reserved, as it were, being filled up with reforms arranged
logically by subject matter under three preambles –– political, economic and
cultural. It would entail ostentatious tampering with the amendment in
order to address the existence of the Electoral College. To do so would
require either an additional section, or ungainly insertion into an original
section, or else elimination and substitution for one of the existing sections.
Against the latter course – elimination and substitution – our
people can mount a resistance within the convention on grounds that it would
betray the backers of the specific section slated for elimination, the very
citizens who would have helped bring about the original call by two-thirds of
the states.
The previous alternative, insertion of extraneous modifications
into one of the twelve sections, is a tactic of ill repute in Congress, where
opponents of a bill try to amend it to death. It is a well-known
parliamentary maneuver against which our delegates will have to be on guard.
The remaining alternative – attempting to increase the number of
sections to thirteen or more – could be opposed on grounds that it would break
faith with the Judeo-Christian component in the alliance, i.e. one of the charter
members in the twelve lights coalition which promoted the constellation law in
the first place.
Of course it would be naive to suppose, given the harsh realities
of the political arena, that the metaphysical / historical implications of an
Amendment with exactly twelve sections – no more no less – would suffice to
deter a runaway convention. Having the aforesaid seven safeguards working
in tandem will,
however, impose a formidable check to a convention getting out
of hand.
The seven safeguards will reduce risk to a level hopefully far less
fearsome to Americans than the immediate threats to democracy, and indeed to
civilization itself, that have already reared their apocalyptic heads.
Following the rabid bite of a wild beast, medical intervention to save an
unconscious victim entails far less risk than letting the malady run its
course.
The runaway system of amendment by adjudication has already
rendered comatose the rule of law under the written Constitution. Our peril is
like a camel compared to which the risk of a runaway convention is merely a
gnat. Ignore guides who are blind or bereft of courage and who council us
to “strain out the gnat but swallow the camel.” [21]
We have reached the stage where radical turnabout is the patriot’s
only hope, at least in this world. So keeping the seven safeguards in mind, let patriots urge
upon the state legislatures the machinery for constitutional revival.
Remind them that Article V was bequeathed by the Framers themselves. Let
the Republic proceed to a convention with hope rather than trepidation, with
faith rather than dread.
History and Procedures
Let
the reader be sure to distinguish between the two stipulations in Article V —
that three-fourths of the states (38) are needed to ratify any Amendment
approved in a convention, whereas only two-thirds (34) of the states need apply
in order to mandate the initial convening of a convention. Note that the
total of states is four less to get a convention called into existence than to win ratification for what it may
propose to the states.
The history of that first stage in the
process, applications by state legislatures, dates back to the months after the convention
of 1787, when New York and Virginia applied for a second convention
to amend the work of the first. As it turned out this early movement for a
second convention “was a rematch of states’ righters against
nationalists ..., netting a compromise in the Bill of Rights.”
[22] The following 22 decades saw hundreds of
applications for a convention on a wide variety of subjects. The
variety was so wide, in fact, that no single topic garnered quite the necessary
two-thirds of the states.[22a] In the twentieth century, three convention
movements (see figure 4.1, orange totals) have fallen short by the narrow
margins of one or two state applications.
The earliest of the chief convention
movements preceded World War I. This was the progressive era which
featured a strong movement for an Article V convention on popular election of
U.S. Senators. Pressure on the issue had built to within an application or
two of the required total, and another eight states were on record for the Senate
reforms.[23] The U.S. House of Representatives had on five
occasions approved an Amendment for direct election of the U.S. Senate, but
until 1911 the Senate stonewalled. Finally, faced with the pressure for a
con-con as applied by the states under Article V, and rather than allow the
states to bypass Congress on the issue, the Senate bowed to political necessity
and passed the seventeenth Amendment.
One member of that U.S. Senate whom the
prospect of a convention did not intimidate was Albert Cummins, Republican of
Iowa. His verbal exchange in 1910 with another GOP Senator, Weldon
Heyburn of Idaho, illustrates the same kind of fear we hear today when a
convention is proposed. In a packed Senate chamber Heyburn spoke at
length about the dangers of a convention that might repeal, modify, or change
the Constitution – the familiar runaway convention argument. Then he
pointed to the "strife and contention" that existed in the country as
evidence that if a convention did convene, it would be hopelessly deadlocked
between hostile factions. Sen. Cummins rose, apologized for being
puzzled, and asked whether Heyburn meant that the convention would be dangerous
or fruitless. Heyburn replied, "It would be both – dangerous if it
were not fruitless, and fruitless if it were not dangerous."
|
|
|
Sen. Everett Dirksen
|
Cummins replied by citing the safeguards
built into Article V (the ratification requirements of three-fourths of the
states). To his credit, Heyburn then perceived his error and virtually conceded
the point. The danger was not critical, he acknowledged, in that the
American people and Congress had "enough conservative wisdom" to
avert the danger.[24]
Danger was again the watchword
circulating in Congress during the 1960's, as a campaign pushed hard for a convention
on the subject of reapportionment for state legislatures. The
convention drive was headed by Everett Dirksen, the classic U.S. Senator from
Illinois. His death in 1969 broke the campaign's momentum just as it
verged on success. Having gathered applications from 33 state legislatures, the
campaign fell one short of the required 34 states.[25]
In the 1980's, a campaign to achieve a
balanced budget Amendment via a constitutional convention peaked at 32
applications.[26] As in the previous convention drives, the cries of
alarm became shrill as the total approached the constitutional threshold.
The following chart gives the subject
matter of the 20th century’s strongest convention movements – i.e. those which
secured more than a dozen state applications.[27]
|
Figure 4.1
|
State Applications for An Article V
Convention
2/3 of states needed, [34]
|
|
years
1899-1983
|
subject matter of proposed amendment
|
number of states with applications on
subject
|
|
1978-1983
1973-1980
1965-1973
1963-1969
1953-1965
1939-1960
1906-1916
1899-1910
|
Balanced budget
Pro-life (anti-abortion)
Revenue sharing
Reapportionment of legislatures
Revision of Article V
Limitation of U.S. taxing power
Prohibition of polygamy
Direct election of U.S. Senators
|
|
32
16
18
33
13
28
27
29
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The main effect of the Dirksen drive of
the 1960's was to spur the Congress, or rather the Senate, into an attempt to
set up procedures that would govern an Article V convention should it ever be
called into session. The late Senator Sam Ervin, a well respected
constitutional expert of the time, sponsored an act to regulate convention
procedures. The Ervin bill passed the U.S. Senate unanimously in 1971 and
again in 1973, but remained locked up in a House committee where it died.[28]
At the date of this writing, many details on convention procedures remain in
the realm of speculation.
Nevertheless the Ervin plan is
suggestive. It set forth a system for electing delegates to a convention that
meshed nicely with some current practices. If the Ervin formula were
applied the convention would consist of 535 delegates, each state to elect the
same number of delegates as they elect now to both houses of Congress, or to
the Electoral College. Each state would select two of its delegates at
large (100 total) the remaining 435 to be chosen in the existing congressional
districts.[29]
Although the Ervin bill never became law,
the bill remains alarming as regards two constraints a campaign for the
constellation law should be prepared to face. Perhaps the least stringent
of the two is chronological: 34 states must apply contemporaneously.
Twenty years after the Ervin bill, the application of the contemporaneous
principle was thrown into doubt. In 1992 the ratification process for
the 27th amendment (re raising congressional salaries) was finally completed
and certified after 203 years. Until then, seven years had been thought
to set the limit on contemporaneous ratifications.[30] The 203 year precedent might or might not have
any bearing on the time frame of securing 34 applications for a constitutional
convention.[30a] What the 27th Amendment’s ratification does tell us is this:
since the constellation law has no time-frame specified for ratification –
unless the convention sets one – there is good reason to persevere once we reach
the ratification stage.[31]
The second and potentially more difficult of the Ervin constraints
is that the 34 applications should propose identical or essentially identical
constitutional changes.[32]
Both these regulations were strongly backed by the Senate when it approved the
Ervin bill, and either could serve in future as a pretext for Congress to avoid
calling a convention, even after the requisite 34 applications are filed.
So far in history it has been Congress alone who has determined whether the
subject matter of applications is essentially the same or not –– the same
Congress which is certain to be hostile to many of the political reforms as set
forth in the constellation law.
Indeed, intentional negligence on the part of a Congress intent on
monopolizing the amending process may well account for the fact that neither
the House nor the Senate has set up clerical procedures to keep track of
Article V applications from the states. From such a perspective, it would be
undesirable to have the Senate clerk and/or the House clerk keep an accurate and
readily verifiable count of state applications for a convention. The point
here is that congressional machinations over technicalities may derive from
antipathy to the process. Congress could thus emphasize the exact form rather
than the general intent of state applications in order to multiply categories so
that no single category of applications will ever reach the requisite 34. (If
we credit the challenged counts by FOAVC,
Congress would appear to have employed this stratagem already, and on more than
one occasion).
Indeed, it appears that a congressional keenness to have sole
control of the amending process led directly to the Ervin bill's death in the
House Judiciary Committee.[33]
In a revealing article and panel discussion, Political Scientist Frank Sorauf
indicates that the powers that be in the House prefer to maintain a nebulous
situation with uncertain ground rules so that if ever applications do reach the
total of 34, then Congress will have "flexibility and freedom to reject
the applications as invalid."[34]
Sorauf had earlier coined the term, “the
politics of uncertainty,” to describe the way Congress plays to its own
interest in leaving the con-con route undefined. As
Antonin Scalia put it in 1979 while still a law school professor: Congress
“likes the existing confusion, because that deters resort to the convention
process. It does not want amending
power to be anywhere but in its own hands.”[34a]
TeLL (the Twelve Lights League) will surely have to address the
problem of variations from state to state in style of applications. If
Congress receives state applications containing 34 somewhat variant versions of
a proposed Amendment, there is a real danger that unscrupulous opponents of a
convention will find enough variability to divide the applications into perhaps
two categories according to subject matter, neither of which alone will total
the required 34. Rather than leave the door open to such a technical
pretext, we should urge the state legislatures to incorporate a common
denominator into every state application. We hope legislators will find
it useful to employ the prototype text of the constellation law (see chapter 12)
as a convenient point of identity between the various state applications.
Divergent provisions preferred from state to state could still find a place on
state applications if the format is as follows:
· The 34 state
legislatures apply to Congress for a convention.
· Every application
indicates the prototype text in chapter twelve as the general subject matter of
the convention. Let a formula be worded within each application making
reference to "an amendment along the lines" of chapter twelve, or
words to that effect. The prototype text might then be included as an appendix
to the application.
· Any application might
add instructions for convention delegates from the respective state.
Delegates would be instructed to propose at the convention such changes in the
prototype text as the application specifies.[35]
Instructing delegates as indicated above
in the third step will enable the various states to propose omissions or
elaborations for the Amendment without jeopardizing the presence of a common
subject matter in 34 state applications. If every application makes the
same explicit reference to an identical version of the constellation law, the
categorization dodge by opponents should be too brazen to employ.
Incorporating the indicated precautions
into state applications will be quite consistent with the intent of the Framers.
Both Alexander Hamilton and James Madison were convention delegates in 1787;
and both stated in writing that the convention process would be controlled by
the states. The Federalist Papers contain Hamilton's observation
that if two-thirds of the states ever apply to Congress for a convention, then
under Article V the words shall call a Convention
are "peremptory" and in the particular of whether Congress issues
such a call, "nothing is left to the discretion of that body."[36]
In 1789 Madison wrote to a Virginia clergyman, "the question concerning a
General Convention, will not belong to the federal Legislature. If
two-thirds of the States apply for one, Congress cannot refuse to call it:..."
A few months earlier another Framer, John
Dickinson, wrote
that, “whatever their sentiments may be, they must call a convention for
proposing amendments, on application of two-thirds of the legislatures of the
several states.”[37]
Potential Congressional Monkey Wrenches
■
And yet Hamilton, Madison and Dickinson have long
been moldering in the grave, and who can tell how the love of position and the
pride of office will lead Congress to vote in the 21st century? Dr.
Sorauf puts great stock in a determination by Congress to defend its own honor
and credibility. Hopefully he is not unduly optimistic in believing that
the inclination of Congress to uphold its legitimacy and fairness as a central
institution in the amending process, will, in the end, outweigh the tempting
impulses to find some pretext for turning back the petitions of the states.[37a]
Russell Caplan is not so
sure, although, like Sorauf, he gives weight to what he hopes will be congressional awareness that loss
of confidence in government is at stake. Caplan notes that “most scholarly opinion finds an
inescapable obligation,” and that the Founders “spoke with one voice on this
duty.” Yet sense of duty in the upper reaches of power is not what it used to be,
and a congressman might argue cynically that the people have pretty much lost
confidence in government anyway, so that there is little to lose in that respect.
Indeed Caplan's historical research reveals that three state legislatures, New Hampshire,
Iowa and Maryland, ignored mandatory referenda in favor
of state constitution conventions, and the legislatures never issued the convention call
at all. In 1965, during the Dirksen campaign, Illinois Senator Paul
Douglas opined: “there is little
real expectation that the Congress will call a convention even if two-thirds of
the State legislatures pass the applications. It cannot, I
believe, be forced to do so.”[37b]
■
Even after issuing the call, Congress
still has monkey wrenches it could introduce to undermine the intent of the
Framers of Article V. The Framers of the Constitution built considerable
complexity into the national legislature, whereas the convention was left
unstructured, with its procedures permitted to be relatively simple and facile.
The convention would consist of a single assembly of delegates (not two chambers
as in Congress); and under Jefferson's lex majoris partis a simple
majority of members present and voting would suffice to submit a proposed
amendment to the states. But in the 1970's, the U.S. Senate exhibited
unanimity, in its amended version of the Ervin Bill, in favor of overriding the principle
of majority rule and imposing a supermajority requirement on the
convention. Caplan argues that had this Senate bill passed into law (in
fact it never got to the House floor), it would have violated the Constitution
by erecting a hurdle that only the convention could impose during the process of
setting up its own
internal procedures. “If Congress were able to raise the convention’s
majority vote, it could choke the convention and thereby do indirectly
what article V forbids it to do directly.”[38]
■
Another concern analyzed by Caplan
is that Congress might let convention proposals wither and die on the vine, by “refusal
to assign a mode of ratification.”
For example, suppose the convention disregards
a provision in the initial congressional resolution that calls the con-con into session,
say a supermajority voting requirement. Acting independently, the
convention proceeds to set its own rules, and it reaffirms the lex majoris partis
for submissions to the states for ratification. An arch-amendment then
passes, say, by 55% to 45% of the convention delegates. Under Caplan's
scenario, the Congress might simply refuse to set the mode under Article V [i.e.
“…as the
one or the other Mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress”].
Even if three-fourths of the legislatures ratify, the courts could indeed rule the
ratifications null and void because the submission was done without Congress.[38a]
■
Another possible
subterfuge is that Congress might find a way to
recognize the petitions as valid and still confine the amending process to
Capitol Hill. Don’t be overly astounded if Congress trots out precedents
in some constitutional conventions at the state level (like the unscrupulous
legislature sitting sporadically as a constitutional convention in
Massachusetts, 2004-07, over the same-sex marriage issue). Congress might call a U.S.
constitutional convention to consist of none other than the sitting members of the
U.S. Senate and House. A kangaroo
con-con consisting of the 535 incumbent members of Congress might convene at
11:30 AM and
adjourn at noon, and that would be that. Article V would have been
vandalized.
Caplan's book argues convincingly that election of convention delegates would be unequivocally
controlled by the states, not the Federal Government. Therefore Congress
cannot elect itself as the convention delegation.[38b]
And yet if, over the decades, the Feds could trample the Tenth Amendment
underfoot as they have, why couldn't they do likewise with Article V?
And with separation of powers as cover the regime’s judicial
branch might be deaf to charges that article V had been violated. Here again,
Caplan sees plenty of room for the courts to intervene. Conservative GOP
Senator Roman
Hruska of Nebraska (1904-1999)
stated in 1967 that if a court order is ignored by Congress, the Supreme
Court itself could order the convention.[38c] But
such judicial intervention would, to put it mildly, be uncertain.
■ Another possible exhibition of
congressional skullduggery would see the process interminably delayed.
Years ago a Congressman told me that even if the requisite 2/3 of the states do
apply for an Article V convention, “the way things work around here it could
take ten years to bring the applications up for a vote.”
After New York voters approved a convention in
1886, it took the legislature eight years to call it.[39]
_______
If the hopefulness expressed by Sorauf and
Caplan does
prove naive, and Congress maintains its control over the amending process by
means of one or more of the above contrivances, then let the states and the people look
to plan B, the original right of revolution implicit in the Ninth Amendment of the Bill
of Rights.[40] This ultimate authority of the people is a right
enshrined also in the “alter or abolish” clause of the Declaration of
Independence. If duty and concern for the integrity of the Legislative
Branch are not enough to keep Congress on the straight and narrow, then perhaps
fear of armed insurrection will make up the difference.
Timid souls will no doubt urge against
the convention mode of reform on that account alone. Better “to suffer,
while evils are sufferable,” they will argue, than tempt Congress to inflict a
constitutional crisis upon the nation, with the attendant risk of giving
credibility to proponents of violence. Better to appease a la
Neville Chamberlain, 1938. After all, they will caution, taking the bull
by the horns is risky.
But what is risk? “The possibility
of loss or injury,” says Webster's Dictionary. The timid approach would
strain out prospective losses or injuries, meanwhile swallowing hook, line and
sinker all the ongoing loss of liberty together with the accelerating injury
to our republic. We are speaking here of something more immediate than
risk – the realm of actuality, not just possibility. We are at a time in
American history where affirming the prevailing trends is, of all courses,
worse than risk. It is more like passively reclining on the rails in front
of a moving freight train.
The familiar avenues of reform are not
working; or rather they do work against us by sidetracking energy and delaying ad
infinitum the radical turnabout necessary to restore the Republic. The
customary political process offers us nothing but an orderly fighting
retreat. Retreating without hope of ultimate victory is just another way
of submitting to the growing tyranny inherent in the status quo. It is an
unwitting decision to surrender slowly.
Instead let us take hope in the closest
thing to a popular referendum that the Framers of the Constitution bequeathed
to us. At this point in history, the Article V convention is the one
peaceful way to restore America the Beautiful under God and the written
Constitution. It is worth a try.
Persuading the 7400
Well
before the hour of decision arrives on whether Congress will dare subvert
Article V, or will instead perform its constitutional duty, our
counterrevolutionary combination must face the formidable task of securing 34
state applications for a convention. To pursue this objective with any
prospect of eventual success, we must build a populist campaign whose cause is
the constellation law and whose focus is the 50 state capitols, or rather the
some 7400 men and women who serve there as legislators.[41]
There is no point is setting ourselves up
for defeat by making a premature approach to these very busy men and
women. Let phase one be widespread dissemination of Treatise on Twelve
Lights, so that
it will come to legislators’ notice as a tour de force with plenty of
people behind it. Enough distribution to reach the bulk of Americans who
read about politics should be
sufficient before we kick off phase two of Plan A: face-to-face lobbying of the
people whom Article V of the Constitution authorizes to initiate the convention
process.
It would be a mistake in my view to begin
lobbying in all 50 state legislatures simultaneously. It would be better
to get off to a good start that snowballs from state to state. Since
grass roots support is key to this whole plan, why not begin with legislators
whose state constitutions afford us the most democratic of tools that can be
applied to the legislative process, namely the initiative?
A major tactical error on our part would
be to start with the direct initiative, insofar as a body of legal
precedent exists to the effect that state legislatures per se, and not the
electorate of the state, are the designated bodies to apply for a convention
under Article V of the U.S. Constitution.[42] As per Article V, a
state application cannot be passed by the people, but only by the respective
legislature. Nor in most states can a popular initiative force the
legislature to take action on an application for an Article V convention.
In nine states, however, citizens circulating petitions can force the
legislature, to take a vote pro or con on the convention application. In
these nine states the process is known as the indirect initiative, and
gives the people some extra clout in moving the issue to a vote. Figure 4.2 ranks the nine states in order of population:
|
|
|
|
Figure 4.2
|
States where citizens can compel floor
votes in the legislature
|
|
State
|
Population [in millions]
|
% of voters
required to petition
|
|
Ohio
Michigan
Massachusetts
Washington
Utah
Nevada
Maine
Alaska
Wyoming
|
11.4
10.1
6.4
6.1
2.4
2.2
1.3
0.6
0.5
|
3
8
3
8
10
10
10
10
15
|
|
Sources:
2000 census;
Initiative & Referendum Inst., Univ. S. Calif.
|
The largest of the indirect initiative
states is Ohio, ranking seventh in the nation by population.
Massachusetts ranks 13th nationally by population. At three percent, the
signatory requirement in OH and MA are the lowest for the purpose of forcing
the legislature to take a public vote. Ohio’s Midwest location is more
pivotal than the Bay State’s; also the Buckeye State borders the second largest
of the indirect initiative states, Michigan, whose signatory minimum is,
however, considerably higher than OH or MA. Later, after the campaign
catches fire, 8-10% the number of voters in the last election will become less
formidable as an obstacle.
It may be that starting first with a few
small states might be a good lead up to the campaign in Ohio. Of course
the activists on the spot will be in the best position to gauge the degree to
which a given state is favorably inclined, or whether TeLL should start with a
few states simultaneously. If TeLL decides to focus on one state with the
indirect initiative, then they might find a larger state like Ohio or Michigan
more receptive to out of state campaigners than a smaller state like Wyoming or
Utah. On the other hand Nevada boasts a multi-billion dollar tourist
industry and might be more open to a convergence of petitioners from outside
the state.
Allow me to digress on a symbol that
inclines me to Ohio. About the same time America was entering the space age, a
nine year old Cincinnati boy, Jimmy Mastronardo, traveled to his State capitol
at Columbus, registered as a lobbyist, and campaigned over the next three years
for a new State motto. At first this movement must have seemed hopelessly
naive if not ridiculous to self-styled realists. Yet the dream became
political reality. It was enacted by both houses of the Ohio legislature,
and signed into law by the Governor in July, 1959. The words remain to
this day [despite back and forth verdicts in Federal Courts] the official motto
of the State that claims both John Glenn and Neil Armstrong.[43]
Ohio's motto consists of the words the youngster took from Matthew 19:26.
|
|
|
Flag of Ohio, the Buckeye State
|
With God
All Things
Are Possible
Remembering this excerpt from Matthew
19:26, let us by no means neglect prayer prior to all major decisions,
including how to organize leadership for phase one and phase two of Plan
A. Both phases should be under the leadership of the Twelve Lights
League [TeLL]. I have already founded TeLL under the laws
of Washington state governing non-profit educational corporations. As the
movement grows, let TeLL’s national steering committee consist of delegates
sent by state affiliates, with an executive board of thirteen elected by county
affiliates.[44] As a first order of business, the TeLL executive
board should elect a chaplain (as should each state affiliate).
In lobbying for legislative support, let TeLL’s
appeal be first to the legislator's higher motives, including piety,
patriotism, reason and political self-interest –– not necessarily in that
order, depending on the legislator being lobbied. When a legislator
remains unconvinced by piety, patriotism or reason (as happens with frequency),
then we can appeal to his or her political instincts. This pragmatic
political appeal should itself take a dual approach: first, by appealing to the
legislator's political stake in listening to constituent's opinions; and
second, by appealing to the interests of state legislators desirous to enhance
the status and authority of the institution in which they serve.
The former is well understood and needs
no elaboration here, although Ted Sorrenson’s summary of the special features
that characterized JFK’s political campaigns are worthy of note.[45]
The latter, the institutional approach, should emphasize in particular the
second section of the constellation law. Section 1:12-13
restores some of the influence which the state governments lost in 1913, upon
the passage of the seventeenth Amendment.
A little historical background is
called for: During the twelve years between Independence and the
ratification of the Constitution in 1788, the country’s first constitution—the
Articles of Confederation –– let each state legislature elect the state's
delegation to the continental congress. Thereafter under the U.S.
Constitution, and for the next 125 years, each legislature retained this power
in partial measure by electing the state's two U.S. Senators. The
populist transformations of American politics prior to WW I saw the abolition
of this state legislative influence on Congress. Under pressure of an
Article V convention movement, the 17th Amendment of 1913 transferred directly
to the people the election of Senators to their seat in Congress. As a
consequence the state capitols have, since 1913, lacked the national stature and
clout that formerly emanated from each legislature's power to select two
members of the state’s congressional delegation.
The Framers of the Constitution deemed it
wise to have an authoritative link between the state legislatures and one house
of Congress. The 17th Amendment totally severed the connection.[46]
The constellation law reestablishes the link – although not with the
U.S. Senate, but rather through the more democratic chamber, the U.S. House of
Representatives. Section 1:12 would empower state legislators to initiate
recall action against members of the U.S. House. Only the voters at the
polls might actually recall a Congressman under section 1:13, but the power of
state legislators to put a Congressman's continuance in office up for a popular
vote, will afford our state senators and representatives far more voice and
clout in national affairs than they have had in nearly a century. This
renewed political link between the states and Congress will decrease the isolation
of the D.C. beltway, and will increase the prestige and potency of a seat in
the state legislature. Accordingly, in lobbying for the constellation
law, let the 7400 legislators hear about how section 1:12 revives the principle
of federalism. Idealistic
legislators will be charmed, the pragmatists intrigued, and the self-interested
enticed.
Furthermore, the legislators should be
reminded of the various decentralizing provisions of the constellation
law. All three preambles preface sections where there is reallocation of
responsibility to the states and localities rather than to the Federal
government. Such decentralization will naturally appeal to state
legislators more readily than to the Feds.
Crossing into
Illegality
The generation ending just after WWI accomplished three
successful grass roots insurgencies: [1] the populist movement for more
democratic elections, and the victorious campaigns for constitutional
amendments favoring [2] prohibition and [3] women’s suffrage. The half century after World War II saw three more popular
upsurges: [4] the civil rights movement under the leadership of Martin Luther
King, [5] the anti-war movement of the Vietnam war era, and [6] the term limits
movement. The latter was manifestly popular with voters where state laws
gave them access to the initiative and referendum. But in 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the populist verdict and reinforced the officeholder class.
Heretofore we have assessed
methods that are akin to the strictly legal approach taken in four of the six
popular insurgencies of the 20th century. But the SMC [Student
Mobilization Committee against the Vietnam war of which this writer was a
campus chairman in the 1960s] crossed the line of illegality on a massive
scale, as did Rev. King’s protest movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s. Both
the Civil Rights Movement and SMC relied heavily on street demonstrations and
other forms of civil disobedience to accomplish their goals. The
militancy implicit in street marches, protests, and sit-downs was vital to
success in opposing racial discrimination, and combined with campus takeovers
proved indispensable in halting the military debacle in southeast Asia. The
populist tumult was indispensable. As
Simon Bolivar’s biographer observes:
It is undoubtedly true that every successful
revolution is at times in need of a mob.[46a]
As for the term-limits
movement, it failed in part because its strategy was so
